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Abstract 
Piper, F., P. Wild, Incidence structures applied to cryptography, Discrete Mathematics 106/107 
(1992) 383-389. 
We consider some combinatorial problems arising from the need to provide security on a 
communications network. Key management is one of the major considerations in the design of 
a security system. We discuss key distribution patterns, a method of reducing key storage in a 
large network, and secret sharing schemes which may be used to protect a key from loss or 
unauthorised access. In some circumstances it is of vital importance that the receiver knows 
that a message has not been altered (accidentally or deliberately by a third party) during 
transmission. We describe combinatorial designs, known as authentication schemes, which may 
be used to provide encodings which can detect such alterations. 
Introduction 
In this paper we discuss a number of ways in which combinatorial techniques 
are applied to problems relating to the provision of security on a communications 
network. We do not include any mathematical detail but, instead, concentrate on 
explaining the security problems and indicating the type of combinatorial 
problems which then arise. 
Secure communications 
In today’s growing communication environment of high speed electronic data 
processing and automatic means of transmission there is an obvious need to be 
able to encode information in such a way that communication is economical and 
reliable. These needs have long been recognised and coding theory, to which Jack 
van Lint has made so many important contributions, is firmly established as a 
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fascinating subject on the mathematical/engineering interface. However integrity 
is not always the major requirement. In many environments the migration from 
paper-based trading to the use of automation has introduced a number of security 
problems; notably the need for privacy and authentication. Authentication in this 
context can (and often does) have a number of different meanings. It might, for 
instance, imply the need for the receiver of a transmission to be able to establish 
the identity of the sender and prevent impersonation by any third party. On the 
other hand it is often used to imply the requirement of being able to check that 
the message received is the one that was sent and that it has not been altered 
(accidentally or deliberately by a third party) during transmission. If accidental 
errors are the only concern then, as we have already indicated, an error 
correcting code can be used. However these codes are not designed to detect 
deliberate errors and anyone who knows the encoding scheme will be able to 
change the content of the message and then re-encode so that the changes cannot 
be detected by the decoder. Thus the provision of privacy and authentication 
requires cryptography. 
The following simple diagram defines an encryption system. 
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Fig. A. 
Mathematically the enciphering algorithm may be regarded as a family of 
functions and k(E), the enciphering key, is used to select the one to be used. The 
deciphering key k(D) then chooses the appropriate inverse function. 
If we regard the message as a binary sequence then many cipher systems 
operate as block codes in the sense that they ‘divide’ the sequence into blocks of a 
fixed size, s say, and encrypt the message block by block. Since a string of s bits 
has many different mathematical interpretations, e.g., the binary representation 
of an integer from 0 to 2” - 1, an element of GF(2”), a vector in V(s, 2) etc., 
many different branches of mathematics are ‘employed’ to provide encryption 
algorithms. However these methods are well-known and widely discussed in the 
literature. We will say no more about the design of algorithms but concentrate on 
other aspects of security. 
First we note that a cipher system is only effective if the ‘matching pairs’ of 
keys are used and thus it is crucial that the receiver knows which deciphering key 
to use. It is customary to assume that the algorithms are known and, if this 
assumption is made, anyone with knowledge of k(E) can impersonate the sender 
while anyone who knows k(D) can read all traffic. Clearly these keys are very 
important and the overall problems of managing the keys is one of the major 
considerations for a secure network. 
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Before we discuss any specific problems we need to distinguish between 
conventional (or symmetric) systems (where knowledge of k(E) implies knowl- 
edge of k(D)) and public key (or asymmetric) systems (where it is computation- 
ally infeasible to determine k(D) from k(E)). In the former the transmitter and 
receiver (essentially) share the same secret information and thus there is a need 
for some form of mutual trust. In these systems the receiver tends to accept the 
use of the agreed k(E) as ‘authenticating’ the user and both would regard 
messages encrypted using k(E) as secret from any third party eavesdropper and 
message authentication might typically be achieved by computing a cryptographic 
check sum (depending on the message and k(E)) and appending it to the 
message. However in the latter system k(E) might be public and, if this is so, the 
use of k(E) will not identify the user. Nevertheless any message encrypted using 
k(E) can only be understood by the intended recipient, who keeps k(D) secret. 
Key storage on a network 
If a symmetric algorithm is used on a network of 12 nodes and if any two nodes 
wish to communicate securely then there is a potential need for &r(n - 1) pairs of 
keys. These keys need to be generated, distributed and stored. The precise way 
in which this is achieved will depend upon the network but one option is for all 
keys to be generated and distributed before the system is used. Clearly for large 
networks this would require considerable storage at each node and it is natural to 
look for ways of minimising these storage requirements. This problem has been 
‘solved’ by introducing the concept of subkeys which are merely pieces of data 
that can be combined to produce keys. Each user is given a set of subkeys 
together with information specifying precisely which ones need to be combined to 
communicate with any other node. By identifying the nodes with the points of an 
incidence structure and the subkeys with the blocks it is possible to translate this 
key storage problem into one about combinatorial designs. 
A basic requirement is that no third party should have access to the subkeys 
that two users combine to produce the key they use to communicate. In terms of 
the combinatorial designs this means that no third point belongs to all of the 
blocks incident with two given points, i.e., the design has line size two. 
Furthermore the imposition of extra security requirements, such as that no group 
of, say t, users in collusion should be able to combine their subkeys and listen to 
the secure communications between two others, translates naturally into interest- 
ing problems about designs. This has been a fruitful and useful area of research 
(see [7,81). 
The key storage problem discussed above is only one of many security areas 
where incidence structures play an important role. Two others are secret sharing 
schemes and authentication schemes. 
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Secret sharing schemes 
There are many situations where something of value can not be trusted to one 
person alone. It may be required that a group of people must concur and 
cooperate in order to have access to the item. For example, it is customary for a 
bank vault to have more than one lock and for no one person to hold the keys (or 
combinations) to them all. The bank might require that k officials carry various 
keys to the locks and that, while any group of t of them will collectively hold keys 
to all the locks, no group of t - 1 of them will hold a key to every lock. The 
problem of determining the minimum number of locks and keys required is 
clearly combinatorial and is known as the bank safe problem (see [9]). 
In another situation it may be required to keep a valuable piece of information 
(such as a cryptographic key) secure. It may be liable to compromise or loss if 
held in one location. A t-out-of-k threshold scheme is a way of dividing that 
information into k pieces so that it may be reconstructed from any t of those 
pieces, but knowledge of t - 1 pieces leaves it completely undetermined. The 
valuable piece of information is secure against the compromise of t - 1 pieces and 
retrievable despite the loss of k - t pieces (see [ 1, 111). 
More generally, a secret sharing scheme (see [13, 171) is a way of distributing 
shares (or parts of the secret) to the participants so that only certain subgroups 
(or authorised subsets) of them may, by pooling their shares, determine the 
secret. This corresponds to a well defined combinatorial problem. 
Let S be a set of elements called shares and let P be a set of k participants. An 
assignment is a mapping d : P+ S. Let D be a collection of assignments and let X 
be a partition of P into 4 classes called keys. If 
(i) for every d E D and authorised subset Q z P any other assignment which 
assigns the same shares to the participants in Q as d does, also belongs to the 
same key class k E X as d, and 
(ii) for every d E D and unauthorised subset Q G P there are at least one or 
more assignments which assign the same shares to the participants in Q as d does, 
but belong to (preferably many) different key classes to that containing d, then 
we call (P, S, D, X) a secret sharing scheme. Clearly if (i) and (ii) hold then only 
authorised subsets can determine the unique key k E X to which the assignment d 
belongs from knowledge of their shares. 
A secret sharing scheme determines an incidence structure whose points are the 
assignments D and whose blocks are the elements of X U (P x S). A point d E D 
is incident with block x E X if and only if d E x and with block (p, S) E P X S if and 
only if d(p) = S. 
Clearly the blocks are partitioned into k + 1 parallel classes; one corresponds to 
the partition X, and each participant p determines another. Condition (i) 
translates as the requirement that points belonging to the same block in each of 
the parallel classes corresponding to an authorised subset also belong to the same 
block in X. A similar statement holds for condition (ii). 
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The collection of authorised subsets, known as the access structure, may vary 
from application to application. In a t-out-of-k threshold scheme the authorised 
subsets are those with t or more members. Several methods of realising secret 
sharing schemes have been described (see [2,4,15,20]). Secret sharing schemes 
have been successfully modelled in geometries by issuing each participant some 
points of the geometry in such a way that the points of any authorised subset 
enable the reconstruction of a particular geometrical object which, in turn, 
identifies the secret (see [15, 16, 18, 191). 
Authentication schemes 
We discuss the model of authentication schemes proposed by Simmons [12,14]. 
In this model there are three participants: a transmitter T, a receiver R and an 
opponent 0. T wants to communicate some (not necessarily secret) information 
to R but R must be sure that it comes from T. 
An item of information that the transmitter might want to send to the receiver 
is called a source state, and we denote by S the set of source states. In order to 
relay a source state s E S to R, T encodes it (using some encoding rule chosen 
from a set I of encoding rules) as a message m and sends m to R. For example, m 
might be obtained by appending a cryptographic checksum to s. In order for R to 
be able to determine which source state is being relayed it is necessary that for 
any given encoding rule a message m can relay at most one source state under 
that rule. T and R agree on which encoding rule they will use before 
communication starts. 
Let M be the set of messages that T can send to R. Let 0 be an element not 
belonging to S. Associated with an encoding rule i is a mapping f; : M -+ S U (0) 
given by J(m) = s if T can encode s E S as m under encoding rule i and h(m) = 0 if 
no source state can be encoded as m under i. R accepts a message m as authentic 
(relaying source state s) if A(m) = s. R rejects m if h(m) = 0. We call the triple 
(I, M, S) an authentication scheme. 
The opponent 0 attempts to get R to accept some information that did not 
come from T. If 0 knows which encoding rule T and R have agreed upon then 0 
may succeed with probability 1. We assume that T and R share an encoding rule 
in secret for each transmission. 0 may deceive R by impersonation or 
substitution. 0 impersonates T by sending a message when in fact T has not sent 
a message. 0 is successful if R accepts the message as authentic. If T sends a 
message m, relaying source state s, then 0 may intercept it and substitute a 
different message m’. 0 is successful if R accepts the substituted message m’ and 
this message relays a source state different from s. 
An authentication scheme (I, M, S) determines an incidence structure whose 
points are the elements of I and whose blocks are elements of S x M. A point 
i E I is incident with a block (s, m) E S X M if and only if f;(s) = m. Clearly the 
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blocks are partitioned into parallel classes; there is one class corresponding to 
each source state s E S. 
The opponent 0 succeeds in deceiving R whenever he sends message m’ such 
that the agreed encoding rule i is on a block in {(s, m’) ) s E S’} where S’ = S if 0 
is attempting impersonation and S’ = S\{$(m)} is 0 is attempting the substitu- 
tion of message m. The requirement of an authentication scheme therefore is that 
the probability that i belongs to such a set is small. Since the encoding rule i may 
be chosen (in secret) at random from the set I this may be achieved by ensuring 
that no message m’ is authentic under many encoding rules, i.e., the blocks 
belonging to a set ((s, m’) ( s E S’} cover only a small proportion of the point set. 
Incidence structures and other combinatorial designs have been very useful in 
the construction of authentication schemes with these and other desirable 
properties. Indeed certain designs provide authentication schemes with an 
optimal level of security (see [5,6,21,22]). 
Summary 
We have not attempted to give a comprehensive overview of how the theory of 
incidence structures is being applied to solve and/or model security problems. 
Instead we have concentrated on the particular instances which are of particular 
interest to us. Nevertheless we hope we have done enough to show that it is an 
active area of research. 
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